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Abstract: The complexity of modern industrial plants poses significant challenges for the design of 
effective alarm systems. Rigorous alarm management is recommended to ensure that the operators 
get useful information from the alarm system, rather than being overloaded with irrelevant state 
information. Alarm management practices have been shown to significantly reduce the frequency of 
alarms in industrial process plants. These practices help focusing the operators’ attention on actually 
critical situations. However, they cannot resolve the cascades of critical situations frequently 
occurring during emergency situations. 
Multilevel flow modelling (MFM) has been proposed as a way of representing knowledge about the 
industrial process and infer causes and consequences of deviations throughout the system. The 
method enables the identification of causes and consequences of alarm situations based on an 
abstracted model of the mass and energy flows in the system. 
The application of MFM for root cause analysis based alarm grouping has been demonstrated and 
can be extended to reason about the direction of causality considering the entirety of the alarms 
present in the system for more comprehensive decision support. 
This contribution presents the foundation for combining the cause and consequence propagation of 
multiple observations from the system based on an MFM model. The proposed logical reasoning 
matches actually observed alarms to the propagation analysis in MFM to distinguish plausible causes 
and consequences. This extended analysis results in causal paths from likely root causes to tentative 
consequences, providing the operator with a comprehensive tool to not only identify but also rank 
the criticality of a large number of concurrent alarms in the system. 
Keywords: decision support, causality, multilevel flow modelling 
1 Introduction 
Modern industrial plants contain a large number 
of interacting control loops and concurrent 
processes affecting the productivity and safety of 
the system. 
While control practices for individual components 
and constrained processes are widely adapted in 
industry, plant-wide control often faces too many 
uncertainties from the environment and the 
interconnected processes to be economically 
feasible [1]. Human operators who rely on alarm 
systems to supervise the plant operation thus 
control the vast majority of plants in the energy, 
petrochemical and chemical industries. Due to the 
large risks for humans as well as the environment 
in case of failures, rigorous alarm management is 
recommended for these industries to avoid 
overloading the operators [2]. 
Alarm management practices have been shown to 
significantly reduce the amount of irrelevant 
alarms presented to the operator by thoroughly 
scrutinizing the necessity and importance of the 
most frequent alarms and where possible 
combining and removing redundant alarms [3]. 
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A well maintained alarm system can avoid 
operator overload during normal operation. 
However, emergencies frequently generate 
cascades of true critical situations throughout the 
plant that overwhelm the operator with so called 
alarm floods. To cope with such situations the 
relation of those alarms needs to be examined and 
compiled into concise information to aid the 
operator in identifying the most relevant and 
immediate threats. [4] 
To identify relevant information during alarm 
floods the causality relation of the occurring 
alarms is a key information. While the analysis of 
historian data on the alarms gives insight in 
common correlation between alarm occurrences, 
inference of causality requires incorporating 
process knowledge. [5] 
Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) provides an 
abstract representation of an industrial process as 
a decomposition of connected mass and energy 
flows [6]. MFM methodology has been proposed 
as a versatile process representation to analyze 
causal patterns in a plant [7]. Inoue et al. [8] 
propose to use MFM for counter action planning 
in unknown emergency situations. Larsson and 
DeBor [9] and more recently Wang et al. [10] 
have demonstrated the application of MFM for 
root cause identification and alarm reduction 
based on identified root causes. The combination 
of dynamic alarm reduction and a system to 
propose feasible counter-actions would enable 
operators to react efficiently to any situation in the 
plant. 
As a starting point toward this comprehensive 
operator support system the extension of the 
method for root cause identification is described 
here. The identification of root causes as well as 
propagation paths based on the causality between 
observed alarms is discussed in this contribution. 
The following sections introduce the MFM 
methodology and the propagation reasoning based 
on MFM models. Based on that the proposed 
method for combination is outlined and 
conclusions for future work are drawn. 
2 Multilevel Flow Modelling 
Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) represents the 
goals and functions of a system by decomposing the 
mass and energy flows as means and ends of operating 
the system. 
Each flow component along the means-end dimension 
is described by basic flow functions. By the 
combination of means-end decomposition of the 
overall operation and part-whole perspective of 
individual flows the function of the system is analyzed 
and can be represented as a graphical model using the 
MFM concepts shown in Fig. 1. As example the MFM 
model of a watermill is considered, adapted from 
Lind [11] and shown in Fig. 2. 
The model shows the main objective of grinding grain 
as obj1, which is achieved by the mass flow of grain in 
mfs1. The grains fed into the mill are converted to flour 
and split-up bran. Energy flow efs1 reflects the 
conversion of the energy from the water by the gears 
and mill stone to energy used for grinding and energy 
losses not used in the system. This energy in turn is 
supported by the mass flow of water into the flume 
across the water wheel represented by mfs2. In this way 
the interacting functions throughout the system are 
described for the nominal operation. 
Industrial plants, however, often have a multitude of 
different operational situations by design. Each of these 
operational modes is defined by different nominal 
functions in the system and thus requires an adaptation 
of the model [12]. As described by Inoue et al. [8] 
adapting the model also facilitates the investigation of 
alternative behaviors of the plant. 
Fig. 1 MFM concepts used for modelling. 
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3 Prognostic and Diagnostic Reasoning 
Based on the MFM modelling primitives the 
propagation of failures through the system can be 
analyzed. Combinations of propagated states and 
patterns in the model describe the failure propagation 
in the system. Zhang [13] describes the most recent 
version of these propagation rules. 
The rules are defined for both, plausible causes and 
consequences of an observed state. The example in Fig. 
3 shows how a failure associated with a transport 
function has consequences on connected functions 
downstream of that transport. Applying all propagation 
rules to an observed failure, a fault tree of failures in 
the model can be generated. The resulting tree 
generally reflects alternative propagation paths at the 
same level. The alternative paths are not necessarily but 
frequently mutually exclusive. 
In conjunction with a set of truth-maintenance rules the 
possible propagation paths of each observation present 
in the system can be dynamically generated. This way 
changes to the observations as well as the considered 
configuration of the plant are taken into account at any 
given moment. The resulting causal paths are limited to 
plausible scenarios connected to specific observations, 
whereas a generic fault model as used by Wang 
et al. [10] comprises a comprehensive causal 
representation of all possible states. While the 
computational burden of this dynamic approach is 
higher than a precompiled causal graph, it yields more 
flexibility to accommodate changes of the system 
behavior. 
The propagation analysis for causes of two different 
faults is illustrated in Fig. 4. Each subordinate level in 
the tree structure reflects plausible causes for the 
immediate parent. 
The fault tra2:low equals to a low processing 
throughput of the mill, meaning that no grain is being 
milled. The other fault tra9:high corresponds to a too 
high flow of water from the flume over the waterwheel. 
The comparison of the two consequence trees reveals, 
that neither of the two observed alarms can be the cause 
for the other. In fact, if the low throughput were caused 
by a fault of the water flow it would be the opposite – 
low flow instead of a high flow as observed. 
In addition, a later observation of the flume level being 
high – sto2:high – is considered (Fig. 5). This 
observation may well be a direct cause for the high flow 
Fig. 3 MFM model of a watermill as described by Lind [11] 
Fig. 2 Downstream consequence propagation of faults on a 
transport function [13] 
Fig. 4 Cause analysis of two faults in the water mill, 
common cause bal3:leak is highlighted 
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of water from the flume. If it were the only fault in the 
system, however, it could not explain why the 
production of the water mill is low in the considered 
situation. Hence, a combined analysis of the possible 
causes and consequences is necessary. 
 
4 Combining Multiple Alarms 
By comparing the cause tree representation for the first 
two considered failures in Fig. 4 the common cause 
bal3:leak can be manually inferred. For a more 
complex system and a larger number of simultaneous 
observations, however, the proper inference becomes 
significantly more complex. This raises the need for a 
general and structured solution for reliable 
identification of the best explanation. 
Considering the combination of all suggested causes 
and consequences as a directed causal graph grants a 
better overview of the whole situation. Furthermore, a 
directed graph can be systematically analyzed by 
applying graph theory. 
The example of tra2:low and tra9:high results in the 
graph shown in Fig. 6. All edges are directed from 
cause to consequence. The green nodes represent the 
states that are supported by observations. The results 
generated from tra2:low are shown in blue and the 
results based on the observation tra9:high are shown in 
black. 
Fig. 5 Graph combining the causes and consequences suggested for two faults in the water mill. 
The graph is directed from cause to consequence. 
Fig. 6 Cause and consequence analysis for observation of 
high flume level 
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tra2:low and tra2:high both cause that the main 
objective of the water mill would fail, i.e. obj1:false. 
This relation is ommited here for readability. 
Finding the root cause in this graph is a matter of 
finding a minimal tree, which includes as many of the 
observations as possible while obeying the directivity 
of the graph.  
The tree rooted in bal3:leak thus yields the best 
explanation for the given observations. In terms of the 
physical system this can be interpreted as the water 
spilling over the water wheel instead of being 
transported by the buckets of the water wheel. This 
could for instance be caused by the water wheel being 
broken or bypassed. 
Each causal tree that can be identified by this analysis 
can be extended to also cover the consequence 
scenarios for the current situation. Considering a tree T 
whose leaves are the observations o(T), the tree can be 
extended by the consequences of each of these 
observations, so long as a consequence does not refer 
to a function that is already considered by any vertex in 
T or any observation from the system. 
Applying this method to the example results in the tree 
shown in Fig. 6. The states in grey are the relevant 
consequences beyond the observed states. 
The combined graph can be efficiently updated with 
new connected observations. Considering sto2:high, 
the complete cause and consequence analysis is already 
present in the graph and no new inference is necessary. 
As there exists no causal tree that also includes the new 
observation, the high flume level has to be an 
independent contribution to the high flow from the 
flume. 
The diagnosed causes would hence be a high inflow to 
the flume (sou3:high or tra8:high) as well as the spill 
of water represented by bal3:leak. The consequences 
will no longer include a low level in the flume 
(sto2:low) as the flume level has been identified as a 
likely cause for the situation. This shows, that the 
combined analysis of fault propagation from the 
observations yields a clear distinction of the causality 
between connected functions in the system. 
5 Conclusion 
This contribution outlined a generic method for 
situation analysis and distinction of causality based on 
MFM reasoning and graph interpretation. 
In the context of alarm management for a complex 
plant the underlying framework as well as the models 
have to be adaptive for many different configurations 
in the plant. 
The method proposed here takes in dynamic reasoning 
results based on an MFM model and has the potential 
to reliably distinguish the direction of causality as well 
as identifying the most plausible root causes and 
tentative consequences of any given scenario. 
This method is currently being implemented in a real-
time environment of a pilot-scale oil and gas 
production plant. Further investigation will be 
dedicated to the efficiency of the method and the 
integration of selective advanced signal processing for 
prognostic analysis of scenarios and fast distinction of 
situations. 
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